Domestic Violence and Succession Indignity

Opinion piece by Bárbara Figueiredo published [in Portuguese] in the Diário de Coimbra newspaper

Succession indignity, or incapacity due to indignity, is a civil law sanction aimed at excluding from inheritance those who have seriously violated fundamental duties towards the deceased. Provided for in Article 2034 of the Civil Code, this mechanism seeks to uphold the dignity of succession by preventing individuals who have committed particularly offensive acts against the deceased or their close relatives from inheriting.

The law lists several such acts, including, among others, conviction for intentional homicide (even if not consummated), false accusation, forgery of a will, or coercion of the testator. Indignity must be declared by a court decision, either through a specific civil procedure, as outlined in Article 2036 of the Civil Code, or within the criminal judgment itself when convicting for intentional homicide, under Article 69-A of the Penal Code. Notwithstanding a declaration of indignity, the deceased may expressly pardon the heir during their lifetime, as per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

However, the crime of domestic violence is not included among the offences that may give rise to incapacity due to indignity. This means that, even after a final conviction for domestic violence, the aggressor may still be entitled to inherit upon the victim’s death.

It is true that there are many other crimes, even if committed against the deceased and resulting in a final conviction, that do not lead to succession incapacity. Yet it is equally true that, due to its specific nature — be it the intimate relationship it involves, the often repeated nature of the abuse (sometimes over a lifetime), or the prevalence it still holds in our society — few crimes shock our collective conscience as deeply as domestic violence.

This raises an important question: is it in line with our most basic moral values — those that bind us as a society and guide legislative choices — to allow a child who has been convicted of violence against a parent to inherit part or all of their estate? Or for a woman, assaulted by her husband, to have part of her assets and rights transferred to her abuser upon her death, assuming no divorce occurred in the meantime? Should the children of such a couple be forced to share the estate with their mother’s aggressor?

Ultimately, we must examine the special relationship that determines, on one hand, the right to inherit from a specific person, and on the other, the classification of the offence as domestic violence. We must ask whether the commission of such a crime does not, in itself, sever that relationship — at least for inheritance purposes — and thus justify a declaration of succession indignity.